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BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The issues presented for review are whether, when the law 
is properly applied, there are genuine issues of fact regarding: 
1. Estoppel of respondents from asserting the statute of 
frauds because of Vaughn Rasmussen's detrimental reliance on 
their representations; 
2. Whether there are sufficient memoranda of the agree-
ments of the parties; 
No. 20512 
and 
No. 20755 
3. Whether Vaughn Rasmussen's partial performance 
entitles him to present his claim for equitable relief; and 
4. Whether the defense of fraud, as asserted by Vaughn 
Rasmussen against the counterclaim, was barred by the statute 
of limitations. 
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITIES 
There are no authorities directly dispositive of the issues 
presented. The applicable statutes of fraud are Utah Code Ann. 
§§ 25-5-1 and 3. The applicable statute of limitations is Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-12-26(3). Additional authorities which bear on 
the issues are quoted or appropriately referenced in the argu-
ment. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Vaughn Rasmussen claims breach of an agreement by respon-
dents Deseret Federal and Crossroads to lease to him space on 
Level One of the Crossroads Mall. Respondent Crossroads 
counterclaims for rent claimed to be due and owing on Vaughn 
Rasmussen's Level Two space in the Mall. 
Appeal No. 20512 is an appeal from final orders of the 
District Court granting summary judgment in favor of both 
respondents. Appeal No. 20755 is an appeal from a final order 
of the District Court granting summary judgment in favor of 
respondent Crossroads on its counterclaim against ctppellant. 
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COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION BELOW 
On December 10, 1984 District Judge Sawaya entered summary 
judgment in favor of Deseret Federal based on the statute of 
frauds. Notice of intention to appeal that ruling was filed 
December 11, 1984. 
On January 22, 1985 District Judge Sawaya entered summary 
judgment in favor of Crossroads based on the statute of 
frauds. Notice of appeal was filed regarding that judgment on 
February 20, 1985 
On May 20, 1985 the lower court entered summary judgment in 
favor of Crossroads on its counterclaim after hearing oral 
argument which focused on whether Vaughn Rasmussen*s asserted 
defense of fraud would lie. Notice of appeal of that judgment 
was filed June 19, 1985. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Beginning in 1980 Vaughn Rasmussen operated a shoe store on 
Level Two of the Crossroads Mall. R. 154-55. Deseret Federal 
operated a bank on Level One of the Mall. R. 155. Both par-
ties were tenants of respondent Crossroads who owned the Mall. 
Crossroads conducted its leasing operations in the Mall through 
its leasing agent, Kravco, Inc. 
Level Two Lease. In May of 1980 Vaughn Rasmussen entered 
into a lease agreement with Crossroads for lease of space on 
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Level Two of the Mall. R. 182-225. That agreement is a 
43-page form lease provided by the lessor containing all the 
terms of leasing in the mall such as use and modification of 
the space and use of common areas. Id. Prior to the execution 
of this lease Vaughn Rasmussen was told by agents of Crossroads 
that the Level Two space was a prime location because Cross-
roads would be constructing an elevated walkway between Cross-
roads Mall and the ZCMI Mall which would open up into Cross-
roads Mall right in front of Vaughn Rasmussen*s space. R. 
239-40. 
This representation was made to induce Vaughn Rasmussen to 
lease the Level Two space. R, 240. It was a material repre-
sentation which Vaughn Rasmussen relied on in signing the Level 
Two lease. R. 240. Vaughn Rasmussen subsequently learned that 
Crossroads never intended to construct a walkway entering on 
Level Two and that the planned walkway was to enter on Level 
Three. R. 240-41. In response to respondent Crossroad's 
counterclaim for rent on the Level Two space, Vaughn Rasmussen 
asserted fraud in the inducement as an affirmative defense. R. 
239. 
Level One Lease. Vaughn Rasmussen nevertheless attempted 
to make his business successful in the Mall. Still anxious to 
obtain the traffic flow he thought would be passing the Level 
Two space, Vaughn Rasmussen approached Deseret Federal and 
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Crossroads about expanding his store downward into Level One. 
R. 175, pp. 20-21. The approval of both respondents was neces-
sary because Deseret Federal was occupying the space wanted by 
Vaughn Rasmussen. Deseret Federal had to agree to surrender a 
portion of its leased space to Crossroads so Crossroads could 
lease the space to Vaughn Rasmussen. 
In July of 1982 Vaughn Rasmussen received Deseret Federal's 
promise to surrender the Level One space on certain terms. R. 
155. In August of 1982 Vaughn Rasmussen reached an agreement 
with Crossroads that Crossroads would lease the Level One space 
to for $20 per square foot, for the duration of Vaughn 
Rasmussen's lease on the Level Two space and on the same terms 
as were found in the 43-page Level Two lease. R. 155-156. As 
additional consideration Vaughn Rasmussen also promised to pay 
previously disputed construction costs relating to the Level 
Two space. R. 156. 
Crossroads also promised in August of 1982 to provide 
Vaughn Rasmussen with a written lease for the Level One space. 
R. 157. 
Based on the agreements and the representations they 
include, Vaughn Rasmussen proceeded to perform the deal and 
make necessary arrangements to occupy the space. Between 
August of 1982 and January of 1983 he paid Crossroads over 
$2,400 in disputed construction costs. R. 157. This was done 
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in reliance on Crossroads' repeated assurances to Vaughn 
Rasmussen that a written lease was forthcoming. R. 158. 
In January of 1983 Vaughn Rasmussen advised Crossroads' 
leasing agent, Bruce Barcal, that he needed to take bids on the 
construction work that was planned and also needed to provide 
funds for remodeling at Deseret Federal's location on 3900 
South. (This remodeling was one of the considerations Deseret 
Federal received for its promise to surrender the Level One 
space.) R. 175, pp. 40-42. Mr. Barcal was also advised at 
that time that Vaughn Rasmussen had applied for a Small Busi-
ness Administration loan in the amount of $250,000 which was 
contingent on Vaughn Rasmussen occupying the Level One space 
and that he wanted the written lease before committing to the 
loan. Mr. Barcal assured him it was safe to proceed with the 
loan and that Vaughn need not worry about the lease because it 
would arrive shortly. J[d. Based on Mr. Barcal's representa-
tion that the parties had agreement and that a written lease 
would be provided shortly, Vaughn Rasmussen obligated himself 
on this loan in January of 1983. R. 157. 
The documents exchanged between the parties provide further 
evidence that the agreements existed and that the representa-
tions were made. As to Deseret Federal the terms of its agree-
ment to relinquish the space are fully delineated in a letter 
dated January 13, 1983, written to Bruce Barcal by Deseret 
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Federal's vice president Howard Swapp. R. 175, Exhibit 2. The 
letter advises Mr. Barcal that Deseret Federal will vacate 
approximately 950 square feet on Level One only if (1) the 
space is released to Vaughn Rasmussen, (2) Deseret Federal is 
released from responsibility for the space and (3) Deseret 
Federal and Vaughn Rasmussen execute additional agreements. 
Id. The additional agreement referred to in the letter was 
drafted by Deseret Federal and delivered to Vaughn Rasmussen on 
March 9, 1983. R. 175, Exhibit 14. This 5-page agreement pro-
vides for Vaughn Rasmussen to arrange and pay for the remodel-
ing and relocation associated with the change. Mr. Swapp's 
letter also authorizes Mr. Barcal's office to act as Deseret 
Federal's agent to close the transaction. This authority 
lasted only until March 15, 1983 according to the letter. 
After January 13, 1983, when Bruce Barcal had the authority 
of Deseret Federal and Crossroads, Vaughn Rasmussen asked him 
where the written lease was. Barcal told him again and again 
that it would be produced any day. Specifically, Barcal told 
Vaughn Rasmussen the leases were coming by way of Federal 
Express to Vaughn Rasmussen's home on two separate occasions in 
February of 1983. R. 175, p. 45. On one of those occasions 
Vaughn Rasmussen stayed home all weekend waiting for these doc-
uments to arrive. Id. 
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More specifically, in a letter dated March 9, 1983, 
addressed to Deseret Federal and copied to Vaughn Rasmussen, 
Mr. Barcal represented that "Kravco, Inc. is presently prepar-
ing leases and lease surrender forms for the square footage 
discussed. You should be receiving the lease surrender forms 
in approximately five (5) business days." R. 161. This letter 
merely restates what Barcal had orally promised to Vaughn 
Rasmussen on numerous occasions since August of 1982 period. 
R. 158. 
Crossroads provided a written lease to Vaughn Rasmussen but 
after Bruce Barcal's authority to act for Deseret Federal had 
terminated. On April 13, 1983 Crossroads delivered the lease 
to Vaughn Rasmussen at his home. R. 159. This written lease 
incorporated all the essential terms of the agreement of the 
parties as reached in August of 1982. R. 9-45. Crossroads has 
previously represented in writing that the written lease docu-
ment would be provided before Barcal's authority from Deseret 
Federal terminated. 
Mr. Barcal failed to provide the documents by March 15 when 
his authority to act as agent for Deseret Federal expired. 
After that time Deseret Federal refused to surrender the space 
despite the undisputed fact that it had appointed Bruce Barcal 
its agent for this precise purpose. 
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After March 15, both respondents provided Vaughn Rasmussen 
with documents which represented their independent attempts to 
complete the transaction. Crossroads provided Vaughn Rasmussen 
with the complete written lease document with the same terms 
the parties had agreed on all along. R. 159. Deseret Federal, 
on the other hand, attempted to bypass Crossroads by subleasing 
the space directly to Vaughn Rasmussen. R. 46-50. Crossroads 
refused to consent to the sublease and Deseret Federal refused 
to consent to a surrender of the space to Crossroads and, 
because neither respondent cooperated, Vaughn Rasmussen never 
obtained possession of the Level One space. 
Vaughn Rasmussen spent a great deal of money to close the 
SBA loan, to prepare construction plans for the store and for 
the Deseret Federal space and to purchase inventory for the new 
store. Because of respondents' refusal to honor their agree-
ments with him, combined with Crossroads misrepresentations 
about the Level Two Space, Vaughn Rasmussen has been unable to 
earn the money needed to pay the expenses mentioned above and 
he has been driven to financial ruin. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
None of the lower court's summary judgments in this matter 
were appropriate. In each instance the law was not properly 
applied to the facts in the record. The genuine factual issues 
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were avoided by a misapplication of the statute of frauds 
defense and by a misunderstanding of how the statute of limita-
tions operates against affirmative defenses. 
Respondents should not even have been allowed to assert the 
statute of frauds. Their leasing agent continuously repre-
sented to Vaughn Rasmussen that a written lease would be pro-
vided and Vaughn Rasmussen acted to his detriment in reliance 
on that representation by borrowing money, purchasing inventory 
and preparing to occupy the Level One space. Utah law clearly 
allows promissory estoppel to over come the statute of frauds 
if the elements of the doctrine are satisfied. Here, suffi-
cient evidence of each element was presented against respon-
dents to raise genuine issues of fact which should be presented 
to the finder of fact and which make the lower court's summary 
judgment improper. 
Notwithstanding that respondents should have been estopped 
to assert the statute of frauds, Vaughn Rasmussen submits that 
the defense should not have been applied as as matter of law in 
favor of either respondent. A genuine factual issue exists 
whether there is there are sufficient memoranda of respondents' 
agreements which satisfy the requirement of a writing. 
Further, the oral agreements of the parties should have been 
considered by a jury for equitable relief based on Vaughn 
Rasmussen's partial performance. 
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With respect to Crossroads' counterclaim for rent, summary 
judgment was also improper. The lower court erred in refusing 
to allow Vaughn Rasmussen to assert the defense of fraud. The 
statute of limitations does not operate to bar assertion of 
fraud as a defense even though it might be time barred as an 
affirmative claim. The uncontradicted facts of Vaughn 
Rasmussen*s affidavit clearly raise a factual question of 
whether Crossroads committed fraud in obtaining its original 
lease with Vaughn Rasmussen and Vaughn Rasmussen should be 
allowed to assert and prove that defense to a jury. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS IMPROPER BECAUSE THERE 
IS A QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER RESPONDENTS 
ARE ESTOPPED FROM ASSERTING THE STATUTE OF 
FRAUDS. 
Vaughn Rasmussen had an agreement with Crossroads and 
Deseret Federal. They agreed to lease him space on the Level 
One of the Mall, and the terms of that lease were fully negoti-
ated, specified and agreed. Through their joint agent, Bruce 
Barcal, Crossroads and Deseret Federal also repeatedly promised 
Vaughn Rasmussen something else - a written lease. Respondents 
never took the simple actions necessary to provide that lease 
until after one or the other of respondents decided not to 
honor their contract. Then, when Vaughn Rasmussen took this 
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action to enforce the lease agreement, respondents raised the 
statute of frauds as a defense. They convinced the lower court 
to dismiss Vaughn Rasmussen's claim because the lease agreement 
was not in writing. It was error to allow Crossroads and 
Deseret Federal to assert that defense as a matter of law after 
Barcal had repeatedly promised to provide a written lease and 
lease surrender form and had induced Vaughn Rasmussen to act in 
reliance on those promises to his substantial detriment. 
In Easton v. Wycoff, 4 Utah 2d 386, 295 P.2d 332 (1956), 
this Court established that the doctrine of promissory estoppel 
is available to overcome the statute of frauds and enforce a 
contract* There, the plaintiff sought breach of contract dam-
ages when his lessor refused to honor their oral lease agree-
ment. The parties had orally agreed to the terms of the lease, 
and the lessor promised to have the agreement drawn up by his 
attorney. The lessor gained summary judgment in his favor by 
asserting the statute of frauds as a defense. 
On appeal, this Court acknowledged the rule which governs 
the present case. It ruled that the doctrine of promissory 
estoppel applies to avoid the statute of frauds if there has 
been a promise to provide a written lease and if there has been 
detrimental reliance on that promise. Id. at 295 P.2d 333. In 
Easton the summary dismissal was affirmed only because no 
showing had been made of detrimental reliance by the lessor. 
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Here, such detrimental reliance by Vaughn Rasmussen is proved 
by the record and respondents should have been barred from even 
asserting the statute of frauds as a defense. 
The facts in the record now before the Court also satisfy 
the requirements of Ravarino v. Price, 123 Utah 559, 260 P.2d 
570 (1953). There a purchaser sought to enforce an oral 
promise to sell real property. The seller raised the statute 
of frauds as a defense, and the purchaser responded by claiming 
that the seller was estopped from doing so. This Court again 
upheld the applicability of promissory estoppel to a promise to 
provide a written contract: 
The binding thread which runs through these cases, 
distinguishing them from the general rule that a mere 
promise as to future conduct will not work an estop-
pel, is the promise is designedly made to influence 
the conduct of the promisee, tacitly encouraging the 
conduct, and although the conduct of the promisee con-
stitutes no performance of the oral contract itself, 
it is something that must be done by plaintiff before 
he could begin to perform, as was known to the defen-
dants. 
Id. at 260 P.2d 576. 
Here Bruce Barcal did much more than tacitly encourage 
Vaughn Rasmussen. Over the course of six months he affirma-
tively and repeatedly assured Vaughn Rasmussen that it was all 
right to proceed with the financing, remodeling plans and pur-
chase of inventory because written documents were being 
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prepared. Barcal also obtained payment of $2,400 in disputed 
construction charges from Vaughn Rasmussen in this manner. 
During the time when Barcal was the agent of both respondents 
he went so far as to specify a weekend when Federal Express 
would deliver the promised documents to Vaughn Rasmussen. When 
these facts are viewed in a light most favorable to Vaughn 
Rasmussen, reasonable minds could clearly find that respondents 
promised to provide a written contract and that Vaughn 
Rasmussen relied upon that promise to his substantial detriment. 
This was the conclusion reached in Mauala v. Milford Man-
agement Corp., 559 F. Supp. 1000 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), under a simi-
lar fact situation. There, the parties had an oral agreement 
for the lease of an apartment at the Biltmore Plaza. The 
lessees viewed the apartment, delivered three checks each 
representing one month rent, and also paid a security deposit 
and brokerage fee. Just as in the present case, a written 
lease was drafted but never signed by the lessor. The lessees 
were given occupancy of the apartment for a short period, were 
permitted to store their belongings in the apartment, and were 
given keys to it. They ordered custom made rugs and furniture 
and arranged for electricity to be transferred into their 
name. The court ruled that these facts created genuine ques-
tions as to whether the lessors had misrepresented that they 
would deliver a lease for the apartment and whether the lessees 
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had suffered substantial injuries in reliance on this represen-
tation. The same factual questions are presented here and they 
require that the summary judgment be reversed. 
In Lacy v. Wozencraft, 188 Okla. 19, 105 P.2d 781 (1940) 
the lessee's showing of reliance on the promise of a written 
lease was much less than that of Vaughn Rasmussen. Neverthe-
less, the Oklahoma Supreme Court reversed the ruling of the 
lower court in favor of the lessor. There, the lessee had 
occupied the premises under a written lease contract for a term 
of three years. She continued to occupy the premises after 
expiration of the lease and during that times the lessor orally 
agreed to lease the premises to her for another three year term 
and to reduce that agreement to a writing. The lessee's only 
evidence of reliance was that she expended the sum of $1,000 in 
remodeling to suit her stock of merchandise and invested 
approximately $5,000 in additional merchandise. 
At trial, the jury was instructed that some benefit to the 
lessor had to be shown before the defense of estoppel was 
available. This was found to be error on appeal. It was suf-
ficient to remove the oral lease agreement from the statute of 
frauds that the lessee had suffered the material detriment men-
tioned above in expectation of the promised written lease. On 
remand, the question for the jury was whether the lessee, with 
the knowledge of the lessor, had so altered her position in 
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reliance on the oral agreement that to invoke the statute of 
frauds would permit a fraud or other injustice to be perpe-
trated. 
In the present case, Vaughn Rasmussen has shown signifi-
cantly more detriment, has shown that respondents promised to 
provide the Level One space and to put their promises in writ-
ing, and has shown that he acted in reliance on those prom-
ises. He obtained an SBA loan, purchased inventory for the new 
store, prepared construction and remodeling plans and paid 
disputed construction costs. His affidavit is uncontradicted 
on these facts. R. 156-58. The affidavit also establishes 
that respondents' leasing agent, Bruce Barcal, represented 
numerous times to Mr. Rasmussen that a written lease would be 
delivered to him. Barcal's representations are further proven 
by his letter to Deseret Federal in March of 1983, stating that 
the lease and surrender were presently being prepared and would 
arrive before March 15, 1983. Mr. Rasmussen incurred very 
significant detriment in reliance upon Barcal's representations 
and did so at a time when Barcal was the agent of both respon-
dents. Also, some of that detriment directly benefited Cross-
roads when Vaughn Rasmussen paid directly to Crossroads over 
$2,400 in disputed costs pertaining to his Level Two lease with 
Crossroads. 
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The record does not contradict any of these facts, much 
less overwhelm them with the weight of contrary evidence. As 
to each element of the doctrine of promissory estoppel there 
is, at the very least, a factual question whether the doctrine 
should apply to estop respondents from asserting the statute of 
frauds. A jury could easily find that allowing respondents to 
use the defense would result in perpetration of a fraud on 
Vaughn Rasmussen and for that reason, the summary judgment in 
respondents' favor should be reversed so that the evidence can 
be considered by a jury. 
POINT II 
EVEN IF RESPONDENTS ARE NOT ESTOPPED TO 
ASSERT THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS, FACTUAL ISSUES 
REMAIN REGARDING THE OPERATION OF THAT 
DEFENSE. 
The statute of frauds is designed to prevent fraud by 
requiring certain contracts to be evidenced by a writing. 
Because of that design there are numerous limitations on the 
statute so that oral contracts may be enforced when the facts 
of the case satisfactorily show that enforcing the contract 
will not perpetrate a fraud. Appellant submits that there are 
significant factual questions about whether some of those limi-
tations apply to the agreements among Vaughn Rasmussen, Cross-
roads and Deseret Federal. More particularly, respondents' 
promises are sufficiently evidenced by signed writings to make 
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them enforceable. Further, Vaughn Rasmussen was at least 
entitled to specific performance based on his partial perfor-
mance of the oral agreements. 
A. Sufficient Memorandum - To be enforceable, Deseret 
Federal's promise to surrender its space and Crossroads' 
promise to lease the space to Vaughn Rasmussen had to be evi-
denced by writings subscribed to their agents. Utah Code Ann. 
§§ 25-5-1 and 3 (1953). The documents presented to the lower 
court satisfy this requirement. 
Gregerson v. Jensen, 617 P.2d 369 (Utah 1980), demonstrates 
that the writings relied on in this case were sufficient to 
entitle Vaughn Rasmussen to a trial. There the parties had an 
oral contract to sell certain land. This contract was shown by 
a combination of two documents: a check endorsed by the seller 
and an unexecuted deed showing the seller as grantor and the 
buyer as grantee. This court ruled that these two writings 
could be read together because the signed writing, the check, 
impliedly referred to the specific deed when it stated that the 
payment was for "1/2 payment on the land as agreed - other 1/2 
payment when deed delivered." Icl. at 373. 
Similar documents prove the existence of Crossroads' 
lease. Like the check in Gregerson, Crossroads' agent Bruce 
Barcal signed the March 9, 1983 letter acknowledging the agree-
ment and specifically referring to the lease and surrender 
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which were being prepared. As with the deed in Gregerson, 
Crossroads also provided a complete but unexecuted lease of the 
Level One space to Vaughn Rasmussen. These documents should 
have been read together to constitute a sufficient writing of 
Crossroads' promise to lease the premises. 
In Estate of Bonny, 600 P.2d 548 (Utah 1979), receipts of 
payment satisfied the statute of frauds even without reference 
to a deed. The receipts simply described the property as 
"11-acre property at Alpine." This was adequate because parol 
evidence combined with this description to leave no uncertainty 
as to which property was the subject of the transaction. 
In Peterson v. Hendricks, 524 P.2d 321 (Utah 1974), let-
ters, such as that written by Howard Swapp of Deseret Federal 
in this case, were treated as sufficient memoranda of a con-
tract. There the parties were partners in a mining joint 
venture. The oral contract provided that the plaintiff would 
work and explore the property and the defendant would, in turn, 
convey to the plaintiff a one-half interest in the claims. 
This agreement was shown by some letters between the parties, 
including one letter signed by the defendant which stated: 
I think we should go ahead as fast as possible on a 
government loan, however, if Slim gets the necessary 
money to reach our objective . . . . 
Then if we hit and form a company. If there is 
only two of us then you shall have a half interest and 
myself a half interest . . . . We don't have anything 
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yet going in order to form a company, and I know I 
trust you and you trust me, but keep this letter as a 
legal paper because this is written down in my hand-
writing and everyone wants something written down 
spelling out their interests. Once we can really 
start mining I think it will make us well off and it 
might make us rich. Until then, we will have to keep 
plugging away. 
Id. at 322. 
Here, the documents signed by Deseret Federal are substan-
tially more certain and specific than those creating a suffi-
cient memorandum in the preceding cases. In particular, 
Deseret Federal's senior vice-president signed a letter dated 
January 13, 1983 which states: 
For several months Deseret Federal Savings and Vaughn 
Rasmussen have been negotiating the proposal that 
Deseret Federal would vacate and Vaughn Rasmussen 
would occupy approximately 950 square feet of our 
space on the main plaza level. 
In order to provide you with the authority neces-
sary to manage this proposal, Deseret Federal grants 
permission to your office to act as our agent under 
the following conditions: 
1. The space is available only to Vaughn 
Rasmussen. 
2. Deseret Federal Savings is unconditionally 
released from all tenant responsibility for the sub-
ject space. 
3. Deseret Federal Savings will not pay any 
fees, charges or commissions to any party for any 
reason relative to the subject transaction. 
4. Deseret Federal and Vaughn Rasmussen's 
additional agreements are fully executed. 
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If for any reason Vaughn Rasmussen should choose to 
discontinue his plans to occupy the subject space, 
Deseret Federal Savings is not interested in any 
further proposals. R. 175 Ex. 2. 
Just as in Estate of Bonny, Mr. Swapp's reference to 950 
square feet of space on the main plaza level leaves no question 
about what space Deseret Federal had agreed to surrender when 
it is considered in light of parol evidence. Further, the 
specific terms of Deseret Federal's agreement to surrender the 
space are spelled out in itemized form in this letter. The 
letter shows that Vaughn Rasmussen had the agreement of Deseret 
Federal to surrender its space on the terms provided. Despite 
the use of the word "proposal," the language of Mr. Swapp's 
letter is substantially more certain than the language of the 
letter in Peterson v. Hendricks, which speaks entirely in terms 
of jif the joint venturers discovered ore. Here, the only 
reason Mr. Swapp used the term "proposal" is because the agree-
ment also required the participation of Crossroads. There is, 
at the very least, a factual question raised by the letter as 
to whether Deseret Federal had committed itself to Vaughn 
Rasmussen. 
The Utah law pertaining to writings sufficient to overcome 
the statute of frauds is satisfied by the record. This becomes 
very clear when the purpose of the statute of frauds is consid-
ered. Mr. Swapp's letter is independent proof of Vaughn 
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Rasmussen's claim that he and Deseret Federal had reached an 
agreement regarding the space on Level One. Even if the single 
letter of January 13, 1983, was not adequate, there is addi-
tional documentation of the agreement. In particular, Exhibit 
14 of the Deposition of Vaughn Rasmussen is a document entitled 
AGREEMENT which was delivered to Vaughn Rasmussen by Howard 
Swapp in March of 1983. This five page document prepared by 
Deseret Federal, shows all of the specifics of the agreement as 
they were understood by Deseret Federal, including the contem-
plated remodeling and relocation of Deseret Federal at the 
expense of Vaughn Rasmussen. Likewise the letter of Bruce 
Barcal combined with the unsigned lease provided by Crossroads 
show, independent of Vaughn Rasmussen's testimony, that an 
agreement existed. For these reasons it was inappropriate for 
the lower court to rule as a matter of law that there were not 
sufficient memoranda of Vaughn Rasmussen*s agreements with 
Crossroads and Deseret Federal. 
B. Partial Performance - Summary judgment also should not 
have been granted for either respondent because there was suf-
ficient evidence of partial performance of the oral agreement 
to entitle Vaughn Rasmussen to the equitable remedy of specific 
performance as prayed for in the Amended Complaint. Utah Code 
Ann. § 25-5-8 (1953) provides: "Nothing in this chapter con-
tained shall be construed to abridge the powers of courts to 
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compel the specific performance of agreements in case of part 
performance thereof." Vaughn Rasmussen performed parts of his 
side of the bargain by paying disputed construction costs, 
obtaining the financing necessary to properly remodel and oper-
ate in the Level One space, providing Deseret Federal with 
remodeling plans for its offices on 3900 South and obtaining 
plans for remodeling of the Level One space itself. These acts 
are exclusively referable to the oral contract and they support 
equitable enforcement of the lease. 
This court recently addressed partial performance of an 
oral contract in Martin v. Scholl, 678 P.2d 274 (Utah 1983), 
where a ranch laborer sought to enforce an oral promise of the 
ranch owner to convey certain real property. The three ele-
ments of the doctrine were stated from a prior Utah case: 
First, the oral contract and its terms must be clear 
and definite; second, the acts done in performance of 
the contract must be equally clear and definite; and 
third, the acts must be in reliance on the contract. 
Id. at 275 citing Randall v. Tracy Collins Bank & Trust Com-
pany, 305 P.2d at 484. 
Elaborating on the second element, this Court noted that 
the acts in reliance must have a direct connection to the oral 
contract. As explained by Professor Corbin: "The performance 
must be one that is in some degree evidential of the existence 
of a contract and not readily explainable on any other 
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ground." ^d. at 275 citing 2 Corbin on Contracts S 425 
(1950). In Martin, relief was not granted because the ranch 
laborer's work at the ranch for a salary and the other acts of 
partial performance could be explained equally as well by rea-
sons other than the oral promise to convey property. 
Here, however, Vaughn Rasmussen has presented evidence of 
actions he took which can only be explained by the existence of 
an oral contract. He obtained an enormous Small Business 
Administration loan which, on its own terms, was for the expan-
sion of his business. He provided Deseret Federal with archi-
tectural plans for its office remodeling at 3900 South, some-
thing he would have absolutely no reason to do were it not part 
of the deal for Deseret Federal's surrender of the space. 
Further, Vaughn Rasmussen paid construction costs pertaining to 
his existing space. This might be explained in other ways 
except that prior to the oral contract for additional space, 
Vaughn Rasmussen had flatly refused to pay the costs. His 
action in paying them was directly tied to Crossroads' promise 
to lease him additional space. Also, Vaughn Rasmussen obtained 
architectural remodeling plans for the first floor space, 
another action he had no reason to take were it not for the 
contract that he lease the space. 
In Martin this Court also looked to independent evidence of 
the oral contract to support its enforcement. It was critical 
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that the ranch laborer had no admission of an oral agreement or 
independent acts pointing to such an agreement. Here, there is 
such evidence. In particular, Crossroads delivered the written 
lease complete with all its terms to Vaughn Rasmussen on 
April 13, 1983. The only reason the deal could not be closed 
at that time was that Deseret Federal had reneged. Deseret 
Federal's actions also independently proved the existence of 
the agreement. Howard Swapp provided the letter dated 
January 13, 1983, both to Crossroads and Vaughn Rasmussen out-
lining the essential terms of the surrender agreement. By the 
letter Deseret Federal also took the independent action of 
appointing Bruce Barcal as its agent for consummating the 
transaction. It also prepared and delivered the five-page sur-
render agreement containing all terms of Deseret Federal's 
agreement with Vaughn Rasmussen. 
These facts show that equitable relief is owed to Vaughn 
Rasmussen because of his partial performance. The existence of 
the terms of the contract is substantially proven independent 
of Vaughn Rasmussen's own actions. The lower court's refusal 
to enforce the contract, at least in equity, allows respondents 
to perpetrate a fraud against Vaughn Rasmussen, in particular, 
by taking his $2400 in disputed construction costs. The 
statute of frauds becomes a sword for perpetrating fraud rather 
than a shield from it. The decisions of the lower court should 
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be reversed so that Vaughn Rasmussen has the opportunity to 
prove more fully the existence of the oral agreement and the 
fraud that was perpetrated by respondents' refusal to perform. 
POINT III 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON CROSSROADS* COUNTERCLAIM 
WAS IMPROPER BECAUSE THE STATUTE OF LIMITA-
TIONS DOES NOT BAR ASSERTION OF A DEFENSE. 
The Utah Supreme Court has held that the statute of limita-
tions bars only claims for affirmative relief. Jacobsen v. 
Bunker, 699 P.2d 1208 (Utah 1985). When a legal theory such as 
fraud is raised as a defense, or counterclaim for offset or 
recoupment, then the statute of limitations does not defeat the 
defense, ^d. at 1210. This Court's reasoning is that a 
statute of limitations is designed to prevent stale claims from 
being asserted, preserve evidence, and discourage inattention 
to claims. When a prayer for relief is timely and the statute 
of limitations has served its purpose, then any defense that 
might be raised to the claim is also timely and the statute of 
limitations has no effect. Fairness and justice demand that a 
party should be granted the full opportunity to defend himself 
against any attacks made upon him. 
Vaughn Rasmussen did not commence an action alleging fraud 
against respondents. Rather, when Crossroads counterclaimed 
against him for rent payments allegedly due, he asserted fraud 
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as a defense to the amounts sought. He entered the Level Two 
lease in reliance on the fraudulent misrepresentations of 
Crossroads. In Jacobsen, this Court indicated its concern that 
parties have a full opportunity to defend themselves against 
any timely claims asserted. 699 P.2d at 1210. That is all 
Vaughn Rasmussen seeks to do in response to the counterclaim. 
The overwhelming majority of other jurisdictions follows 
and supports the position taken by the Utah Supreme Court. A 
party may plead any legal theory as a defense and prove damages 
so as to reduce the plaintiff's ultimate judgment. Christenson 
v. Akin, 183 Kan. 207, 326 P.2d 313 (1958). See also Powers v. 
Sturgeon, 100 Kan. 604, 376 P.2d 904 (1962). Any affirmative 
defense or claim to an offset or recoupment will not be 
destroyed by a statute of limitations if the legal theory 
arises "out of the transactional subject of the suit . . . and 
the main action is timely." Hawkeye-Security Insurance Co. v. 
Apodaca, 524 P.2d 874, 879 (Wyo. 1974). Even though the claim 
would be barred if asserted as a cause for affirmative relief, 
it is allowed as a defense as long as the affirmative action is 
timely. The reason for this, as simply stated in Hawkeye-
Security, is that the purpose of a statute of limitations is to 
bar actions, not to suppress or deny matters of defense. 524 
P.2d at 879. 
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Since 1980, every state high court in the Pacific region 
has held that when a legal theory is raised as a matter of pure 
defense, or as a basis for recoupment or offset, it will not be 
barred by a statute of limitations even though the theory would 
be barred if it was asserted as an affirmative cause of 
action. See Goldberg v. Sanglier, 27 Wash. App. 179, 616 P.2d 
1239 (1980) (statutes of limitations apply to actions, but not 
pure defenses to actions); Aetna Finance Co. v. Pasguali, 128 
Ariz. 471, 626 P.2d 1103 (1981) (a statute of limitations is 
not a bar to a recoupment defense and such a defense survives 
as long as plaintiff's claim can be asserted); Ackmann v. 
Merchants Mortgage & Trust Corp., 645 P.2d 7 (Colo. 1982) (a 
statute of limitations bars the use of a claim for affirmative 
relief, but is not a bar to asserting that claim as a defense); 
Viehweg v. Thompson, 103 Idaho 265, 647 P.2d 311 (1982) 
(statute of limitations does not bar a counterclaim that seeks 
an offset interposed defensively against a complaint arising 
from the same incident); State Board of Regents v. Holt, 8 Kan. 
App. 436, 659 P.2d 836 (1983) (the running of a period of limi-
tations will not preclude a defendant from asserting an other-
wise meritorious claim by way of setoff or recoupment to the 
extent of the plaintiff's claim, so long as the claims 
co-exist); Hartwell Corp. v. Smith, 686 P.2d 79 (Idaho 1984) 
(when a defense arises out of the same factual setting the 
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claim is based on, the theory upon which the defense is based 
will not be barred by a limitation on actions); and Dawe v. 
Merchants Mortgage & Trust Corp., 683 P.2d 796 (Colo. 1984) 
(statute of limitations is not a bar to assert any claim as a 
defense when the claim would otherwise be untimely if asserted 
as a cause of action). 
The lower court based its decision in favor of Crossroads 
on its opinion that the defense of fraud asserted by 
Mr. Rasmussen "will not lie." R. 244. It appears that the 
court did not consider the fraud defense to have been timely 
raised. Jacobsen and the other case law cited above demon-
strates that this is simply not the case. 
If the claim or counterclaim to which the defense is 
asserted is timely, then the evidence will be preserved, the 
claim will receive appropriate and timely attention and justice 
will be best served because the complete matter will be dis-
posed of in a timely fashion. Vaughn Rasmussen should not be 
penalized because, for whatever reason, he chose not to sue 
Crossroads for fraud in connection with the Level Two lease. 
His decision does not eliminate the uncontradicted facts in his 
affidavit that Crossroads blatantly misrepresented to him the 
location of the planned walkway and did so to induce him to 
enter the Level Two lease. The summary judgment on Crossroads' 
counterclaim should be reversed so that Mr. Rasmussen can pre-
sent evidence of fraud as a defense to the counterclaim. 
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CONCLUSION 
Appellant submits that the lower court's treatment of this 
case was improper for several reasons. Because of their 
promise to provide a written contract, respondents are estopped 
to assert the statute of frauds. Furthermore, the merits of 
that defense were not established as a matter of law because of 
the written evidence of the agreements and because of Vaughn 
Rasmussen's partial performance. Finally, it was wholly 
improper to deny Vaughn Rasmussen the opportunity to assert 
fraud as a defense. For these reasons appellant respectfully 
submits that the rulings of the District Court should be 
reversed in all respects. 
DATED this P± day of September, 1985. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Ree6/L. Mrfrt ineau 
^ c E , Madsen 
Stephen J. Hill 
John R. Lund 
Attorneys for Appellant 
-30-
ADDENDUM 
25-1-1! 
(1) To a partner, whether with or without a 
promise by him to pay partnership debts; or, 
(2) To a person not a partner without fair consid-
eration to the partnership, as distinguished from 
consideration to the individual partners. if$3 
25-1-11. Trust for grantor void. 
All deeds, gifts, conveyances, transfers or assign-
ments, verbal or written, of goods, chattels, or 
things in action made in trust for the use of the 
person making the same shall be void as against the 
existing or subsequent creditors of such person. vm 
25-1-12. "Creditors,* "purchasers" Includes Mrs. 
Every conveyance, charge, instrument or proceed-
ing declared to be void by the provisions of this 
chapter as against creditors and purchasers shall be 
equally void as against the heirs, successors, 
personal representatives or assigns of such creditors 
or purchasers. ifS3 
25*1-13. Bona M e purchasers sot affected. 
The provisions of this chapter shall not be 
construed to affect or impair the title of a purchaser 
for a valuable consideration, unless it appears that 
such purchaser had previous notice of the fraudul-
ent intent of his immediate grantor, or of the fraud 
rendering void the title of such grantor. its? 
25-1-14. Saks without change of possession. 
Every sale made by a seller of goods or chattels 
in his possession or under his control, and every as-
signment of goods and chattels, unless the same is 
accompanied by a delivery within a reasonable time, 
and is followed by an actual and continued change 
of the possession of the things sold or assigned, 
shall be conclusive evidence of fraud as against the 
creditors of the seller or assignor, or subsequent p-
urchasers in good faith. The word 'creditors' as 
used in this section shall be construed to include all 
persons who shall be creditors of the seller or 
assignor at any time while such goods and chattels 
shall remain in his possession or under his control. 
19S3 
25-1-15. Sights of creditors with matured dalms. 
Where a conveyance or obligation is fraudulent as 
to a creditor, such creditor, when his claim has 
matured, may, as against any person, except a 
purchaser for fair consideration without knowledge 
of the fraud at the time of the purchase or one who 
has derived title immediately or mediately from such 
a purchaser: 
(1) Have the conveyance set aside or obligation 
annulled to the extent necessary to satisfy his claim; 
or, 
(2) Disregard the conveyance, and attach, or levy 
execution upon, the property conveyed. 
A purchaser who without actual fraudulent intent 
lias given less than a fair consideration for the con-
veyance or obligation may retain the property or 
obligation as security for repayment. its) 
25-1-16. Rights of creditors with dalms aot 
matured. 
Where a conveyance made or obligation incurred 
is fraudulent as to a creditor whose claim has not 
matured, he may proceed in a court of competent 
jurisdiction against any person against whom he 
could have proceeded, had his claim matured, and 
the court may: 
(1) Restrain the defendant from disposing of his 
property; 
(2) Appoint a receiver to take charge of the 
property; 
Fraud UTAH CODE J985-19W 
(3) Set aside the conveyance or annul the obligat-
ion; or, 
(4) Make any order which the circumstances of 
the case may require. i*» 
Chapter 2. Sale of Merchandise in Bulk 
25-2-1 to 25-2-5. Repealed. IMS 
Chapter 3. Leases and Sales of Livestock 
25-5-1 to 25-5-4. Repealed. ws 
Chapter 4. Marketing Wool 
25-4-1 to 25-4-3. Repealed. ms 
Chapter 5. Statute of Frauds 
25-5-1. Estate or interest la real property. 
254-2. WUs aad smoked trusts excepted. 
25-5-3. Leasts aad coatrocti for interest la toads. 
25-5-4. Certata agronaeaU void antes* writtea aad taostri-
25-5-5. Sepreseatatioa at to credit of third aersoa. 
25-5-4. Promise to aaswer for obligattoa of aaother • 
When aot required to he la writiag. 
25*5-7. Coatractf by telegraph deeaed writtea. 
25-5-1. Right to apedftc nerioraaact aot affected. 
25-5-9. Ageat stay rfft for prtadptJ. 
25-5-1. Estate or Interest hi real property. 
No estate or interest in real property, other than 
leases for a term not exceeding one year, nor any 
trust or power over or concerning real property or 
in any manner relating thereto, shall be created, 
granted, assigned, surrendered or declared otherwise 
than by act or operation of law, or by deed or con-
veyance in writing subscribed by the party creating, 
granting, assigning, surrendering or declaring the 
same, or by his lawful agent thereunto authorized 
by writing. ltss 
25-5-2. Wills and Implied tnuU excepted. 
The next preceding section [25-5-1] shall not be 
construed to affect the power of a testator in the d-
isposition of his real estate by last will and testame-
nt; nor to prevent any trust from arising or being 
extinguished by implication or operation of law. ms 
25-5-3. Leases and contracts for Interest In lands. 
Every contract for the leasing for a longer period 
than one year, or for the sale, of any lands, or any 
interest in lands, shall be void unless the contract, 
or some note or memorandum thereof, is in writing 
subscribed by the party by whom the lease or sale is 
to be made, or by his lawful agent thereunto autho-
rized in writing. && 
25-5-4. Certain agreements void anleas written and 
subscribed. 
In the following cases every agreement shall be 
void unless such agreement, or some note or memo-
randum thereof, is in writing subscribed by the 
party to be charged therewith: 
(1) Every agreement that by its terms is not to be 
performed within one year from the making 
thereof. 
(2) Every promise to answer for the debt, default 
or miscarriage of another. 
(3) Every agreement, promise or undertaking 
made upon consideration of marriage, except 
mutual promises to marry. 
(4) Every special promise made by an executor or 
administrator to answer in damages for the liabiliti-
es, or to pay the debts, of the testator or intestate 
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out of his own estate. 
(5) Every agreement authorizing or employing an 
agent or broker to purchase or scU real estate for 
compensation. tm 
25-5-5. Representation as to credit of third person. 
To charge a person upon a representation as to 
the credit of a third person, such representation, or 
some memorandum thereof, must be in writing sub-
scribed by the party to be charged therewith, tfss 
25-54. Promise to answer for obligation of another 
• When not required to be in writing. 
A promise to answer for the obligation of 
another in any of the following cases is deemed an 
original obligation of the promisor and need not be 
in writing: 
(1) Where the promise is made by one who has 
received'property of another upon an undertaking 
to apply it pursuant to such promise, or by one who 
has received a discharge from an obligation in 
whole or in part in consideration of such promise. 
(2) Where the creditor parts with value or eniers 
into an obligation in consideration of the obligation 
in respect to which the promise is made in terms or 
under circumstances such as to render the party 
making the promise the principal debtor and the 
person in whose behalf it is made his surety. 
(3) Where the promise, being for an antecedent 
obligation of another, is made upon the considerat-
ion that the party receiving it cancel the antecedent 
obligation, accepting the new promise as a substit-
ute therefor; or upon the consideration that the 
party receiving it releases the property of another 
from a levy or his person from imprisonment under 
an execution on a judgment obtained upon the ant-
ecedent obligation; or upon a consideration benefic-
ial to the promisor, whether moving from either 
party to the antecedent obligation or from another 
person. 
(4) Where a factor undertakes for a commission 
to sell merchandise and to guarantee the sale. 
(5) When the holder of an instrument for the 
payment of money upon which a third person is or 
may become liable to him transfers it in payment of 
* precedent debt of his own, or for a new consider-
ation, and in connection with such transfer enters 
into a promise respecting such instrument. m 
25-5-7. Contracts by telegraph deemed written. 
Contracts made by telegraph shall be deemed to 
be contracts in writing, and all communications tent 
by telegraph and signed by the person sending the 
tame, or by his authority, shall be deemed to be 
Communications in writing. ifS3 
i5-5-g. Right to specific performance not affected. 
Nothing in this chapter contained shall be 
Construed to abridge the powers of courts to compel 
the specific performance of agreemenu in case of 
Part performance thereof. itss 
25-5-9. Agent may sign for principal. 
Every instrument required by the provisions of 
this chapter to be subscribed by any party may be 
subscribed by the lawful agent of such party. tm 
Fraud 25-5-9 
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C. Keith Rooker, Esq. (A2796) 
Robert S. Clark, Esq. (A4015) 
ROOKER, LARSEN, KIMBALL & PARR 
Attorneys for Defendant 
185 South State Street 
Suite 1300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-7840 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
VAUGHN RASMUSSEN, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DESERET FEDERAL SAVINGS 
& LOAN ASSOCIATION, et al., 
Defendant. 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND ORDER 
OF DISMISSAL AS TO DESERET 
FEDERAL SAVINGS AND LOAN 
ASSOCIATION 
Civil No. C83-6988S 
A hear ing was conduc ted on November 1 9 , 1984 , on t h e 
Motion of Defendant Desere t Federal Savings and Loan Assoc ia t ion 
( " D e s e r e t F e d e r a l " ) f o r Summary J u d g m e n t . P l a i n t i f f was 
r e p r e s e n t e d by S t e p h e n J . H i l l and Rex E. Madsen of Snov/, 
Chr i s t ensen and Mart ineau. D e s e r e t F e d e r a l was r e p r e s e n t e d by 
R o b e r t S. C l a r k of R o o k e r , L a r s e n , K i m b a l l & P a r r . Af t e r 
reviewing the motion and the p l ead ings and f i l e in t h i s m a t t e r , 
and a f t e r hear ing the argument of counsel t h e r e o n , and good cause 
appearing t h e r e f o r , 
Addendum A-3 
IT IS HEREBY OPDERED: 
1. Defendant Deseret Federal!s Motion for Summary 
Judgment is granted. 
2. All claims for relief and causes of action 
asserted against Deseret Federal Savings and Loan Association are 
dismissed with prejudice. 
Approved as to form: 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
By: 
Itephen J . HilJU Ste e  . ilJL/, Esq. 
At to rneys for P l a i n t i f f 
At^^ii^bzi. 
Honorable James S.^Sawaya 
D i s t r i c t Judge A T T r-r>-~ 
By 
D
^ - / c7, 
ROOKER, LARSEN, KIMBALL & PARR 
By: 
Robert S. Clark, Esq* 
Attorneys for Defendant 
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Robert M. Anderson, 0108 
Richard D. Parry, 4112 
BERMAN & ANDERSON 
50 South Main street, Suite 1250 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144 
Telephone: 328-2200 
Attorneys for Defendants 
The Equitable Life Assurance Society 
of the United States and Okland-Foulger 
Company, d/b/a Crossroads Plaza Associates 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
VAUGHN RASMUSSEN, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DESERET FEDERAL SAVINGS 
& LOAN ASSOCIATION, a Utah 
corporation, and THE EQUITABLE 
LIFE ASSURANCE SOCIETY OF THE 
UNITED STATES, a New York 
corporation, and OKLAND-
FOULGER COMPANY, a Maryland 
joint venture, d/b/a CROSSROADS 
PLAZA ASSOCIATES, 
Defendants. 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND ORDER 
OF DISMISSAL AS TO THE 
EQUITABLE LIFE ASSURANCE 
SOCIETY OF THE UNITED 
STATES AND OKLAND-FOULGER 
COMPANY d/b/a CROSSROADS 
PLAZA ASSOCIATES 
Civil No. C83-6988 
Judge James S. Sawaya 
A hearing was conducted on January 7, 1985, on the 
Motion of Defendants The Equitable Life Assurance Society of 
the United states and Okland-Foulger Company, d/b/a Crossroads 
Plaza Associates for Summary Judgment. Plaintiff was 
represented by Stephen J. Hill of Snow, Christensen and 
Martineau, Crossroads Plaza Associates was represented by 
Addendum A-5 i 
Richard D. Parry of Berman & Anderson. After reviewing the 
motion and the pleadings on file in this matter, and after 
hearing the arguments of counsel thereon, and good cause 
appearing therefor, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 
1. Defendants', The Equitable Life Assurance Society 
of the United States and Okland-Foulger Company, d/b/a 
Crossroads Plaza Associates, Motion for Summary Judgment is 
granted. 
2. All claims for relief and causes of action 
against defendants The Equitable Life Assurance Society of the 
United States and Okland-Foulger Company, d/b/a Crossroads 
Plaza Associates are dismissed with prejudice. 
DATED this day of January, 1985.-
Approved as to form: 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Stephen J. Hill, Esq. 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
By 
^-r-i^~7' 
Hcpnorable James S 
D i s t r i c t Judge 
. Sa>/a: ay a 
BERMAN & ANDERSON 
B y : / U v Lf* A /"! / 
Richard D. Parr'y -?^" 
Attorneys for Defendants Addendum A-6 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that true and correct copies of the 
foregoing Summary Judgment and Order of Dismissal were mailed, 
postage prepaid, this ^pl^ day of January, 1985, to: 
Reed L. Martineau, Esq. 
Rex E. Madsen, Esq. 
Stephen J. Hill, Esq. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
P.O. Box 3000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
C. Keith Rooker, Esq. 
Robert S. Clark, Esq. 
ROOKER, LARSEN, KIMBALL & PARR 
185 South State Street, Suite 1300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Deseret Federal Savings & Loan 
1078P 
011185 
ft/n<&<j f) ffira/.*? J 
* . . > • - » 
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/ui^ fZtMsty* ',04^ 
SiUizJ^t/ ;J. /^>J^y. 
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CLERK 
REPORTER 
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DATE: 
/ 
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BAILIFF 
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Robert M. Anderson, 0108 
Richard D. Parry, 4112 
BERMAN & ANDERSON 
50 South Main Street, Suite 1250 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144 
Telephone: 328-2200 
Attorneys for Defendants P* ~ 19 7 ^O ' ' 
The Equitable Life Assurance Society S^'Zr /Tc - 2 /5 F^m 
of the United States and Okland-Foulger L c 
Company, d/b/a Crossroads Plaza Associates 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
VAUGHN RASMUSSBN. 
Plaintiff. 
vs. 
DESERET FEDERAL SAVINGS ] 
& LOAN ASSOCIATION, et al.. ] 
Defendants. ; 
i SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON COUNTER-
• CLAIM OF THE EQUITABLE LIFE 
) ASSURANCE SOCIETY OF THE 
> UNITED STATES AND OKLAND-| FOULGER COMPANY, d/b/a 
) CROSSROADS PLAZA ASSOCIATES 
l Civil No. C83-6988 
I Judge James S. Sawaya 
A hearing was conducted on May 6, 1985. on the Motion of 
The Equitable Life Assurance Society of the United States and 
Okland-Foulger Company, d/b/a Crossroad Plaza Associates for 
summary judgment on their Counterclaim. Plaintiff Vaughn 
Rasmussen was represented by Rey E. Madsen and John R. Lund of 
Snow, Christensen and Martineau, Crossroads Plaza Associates were 
represented by Richard D. Parry of Berman & Anderson. After 
reviewing the motion and the pleadings on file in this matter, and 
after hearing the arguments of counsel thereon, and good cause 
appearing therefor, 
,ADdendum A-9 
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IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 
1. The Motion of the Equitable Life Assurance Society of 
the United States and Okland-Foulger Company, d/b/a Crossroad Plaza 
Associates for summary judgment on their Counterclaim is granted. 
2. Judgment is rendered against Vaughn Rasmussen and in 
favor of Crossroad Plaza Associates in the amount of Seventeen 
Thousand Six Hundred Ninety-Eight Dollars and Eighty-Four Cents 
($17,698.84) which represents the full amount of payments due to 
Crossroads Plaza Associates as of the date of this judgment after 
the subtraction of $399.72 in tenant improvements disputed by 
Vaughn Rasmussen, together with interest thereon from the date of 
judgment at the rate of 10% per annum. 
DATED this 20 day of May, 1985. 
Ron^fiible James S. Sawaya 
Di'Btrict Judge A T T E S T 
H. DIXON H I N D L E Y 
Cler* 
Approved as to form: 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
By N> • w ^ n h 
Deputy Clerk 
By 
Stephen J. Hill 
Attorneys for Vaughn Rasmussen 
BERMAN & ANDERSON 
By y ^ r > ^ S' <£S{ ^ y^ 
Richard D. Parry 
Attorneys for The Equitable Life Assurance Society 
of the United States and Okland-Foulger 
Company, d/b/a Crossroads Plaza Associates 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
1 hereby certify that on the 10th day of May, 1985, a 
true and correct copy of foregoing SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON 
COUNTERCLAIM OF THE EQUITABLE LIFE ASSURANCE SOCIETY OF THE 
UNITED STATES AND OKLAND FOULGER COMPANY, d/b/a CROSSROADS PLAZA 
ASSOCIATES was hand delivered to the following: 
Reed L. Martineau, Esq. 
Rex E. Madsen. Esq. 
Stephen J. Hill, Esq. 
SNOW. CHR1STENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Ten Exchange Place. Eleventh Floor 
P.O. Box 3000 
Salt Lake City. Utah 84110 
1463P 
050985 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
a / / '• t L*^z. UL**t / / '' i>\ 
S 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 23rd day of September, 1985, 
four true and correct copies of Brief of Appellant were hand 
delivered to each of the foregoing: 
Robert S. Clark 
Larsen, Kimball, Parr & Crockett 
185 South State Street, Suite 1300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Defendant/Respondent 
Deseret Federal 
Robert M. Anderson 
Richard D. Parry 
Berman & Anderson 
50 South Main, Suite 1250 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144 
Attorneys for Defendant/Respondent 
The Equitable Life Assurance 
Society and Okland-Foulger Company 
DATED this «-J day of September, 1985. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Pbhn R. fcund 
'Attorneys for Plaintiff/ 
Appellant 
